

**Analyzing Michigan House Voting Records Using the
“MichiganVotes.org” Database**

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Abstract

MichiganVotes.org is a free online database sponsored by the Mackinac Center for Public Policy that since 2001 has provided concise, plain-English descriptions of every bill, amendment and vote in the Michigan state House and Senate. This secondary source was used to test a hypothesis regarding the Republican and Democratic legislative caucuses in 2002 and 2004. Specifically, was there a significant difference between the behavior of the caucuses in voting on those bills that had an effect on the amount of government authority. Because the secondary source used for the project (MichiganVotes.org) provides concise descriptions of every roll call vote, it was possible to test the hypothesis using a large sample of votes, and with reference to the actual content of the votes. A method of content analysis was applied to the MichiganVotes.org descriptions of bills in the sample to determine whether each increased, decreased or had no effect on the level of government authority. It was found that there was a significant difference between the voting behavior of the caucuses on this dimension, and that the MichiganVotes.org database is a useful tool for such research.

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I.

Introduction

For several years a new resource has been available to scholars studying roll call voting behavior in legislative bodies. It is an online database currently in use to track votes in state legislatures, powered by software created by USAVotes.org, a private, for-profit entity that has licensed its product to non-profit state-based think tanks in Michigan, Washington state, and Kentucky. This tool has not yet been used by political science researchers.

MichiganVotes.org was the first example of this resource in operation. Since January, 2001 it has provided concise, non-partisan, plain-English descriptions of every vote by every Michigan legislator. The site is unique in its comprehensiveness – not just selected votes are described, but all of them. The database offers the potential to analyze the voting record of all 148 Michigan legislators on the basis of thousands of roll call votes.

The web site's descriptions of votes are nonpartisan, and capture in plain-English terms the main effect of the changes or additions to the statute books made by bills and amendments, rather than the sponsor's intentions. Because the descriptions are concise and written in "plain-English," they make it possible to include the substance of a large number of votes in a voting record analysis without needing to dive into legislative minutiae. In effect, the MichiganVotes.org description editor has already done this, and has attempted to fairly and accurately describe the votes and bills.

This research project has three purposes. The first is to determine whether the MichiganVotes database is a useful political science research tool. Specifically, can it be

used to create a legislative voting record analysis that is based on the substance of the votes themselves (rather than just the relative “locations” of a set of lawmakers), that is not dependent on the “ratings” of any particular interest group, and that other researchers can replicate.

The second purpose is an effort to develop a criterion with which to categorize votes on bills that does not require the user to understand and interpret arbitrary and changing definitions of “left vs. right” or “conservative vs. liberal,” is replicable, is applicable to any legislature in any era, and is based on the actual substance of the votes. The criterion is a question with a yes or no answer: “Does a vote increase the authority of government?” The is accomplished here by applying a form of content analysis to the MichiganVotes.org vote descriptions using this criterion.

The third purpose is to test a hypothesis about the voting behavior of legislative caucuses in the Michigan House of Representatives in two different legislatures:

1. In their votes on 119 randomly selected bills that were ultimately signed into law in 2004, and 149 bills from 2002 (20 percent of the total in both years), there was a significant difference between the behavior of the Republican and Democratic caucuses of the Michigan House of Representatives on those bills that had an effect on the amount of government authority (69 out of 119 bills in 2004 and 46 out of 149 in 2002).

Both 2002 and 2004 were the second years of Michigan’s two-year legislative cycle. In both years Republicans controlled both houses of the legislature.

The form of the research is such that the techniques and data assembled for this project could be extended to include future legislatures characterized by different internal dynamics (such as a change in majority).

II

Literature Review: Analyzing the Voting Records of Legislators

Explaining the behavior of legislators in democratic systems, including their voting patterns, is a regular theme in the political science academic literature. Many theories have been advanced and challenged. Among these (and to greatly simplify) are that votes are determined by a legislator's desire to appeal to the "median voter" in his or her district (Downs, 1957) or to non-centrist party activists more likely to participate in primary elections (Erickson & Wright, 2001); by a single-minded pursuit of reelection (Mayhew, 1974); by the institutional dynamics of cycles of interparty competition (Aldrich & Rhode, 2001); by the influence of party (Snyder & Groseclose, 2000; Wright & Schaffner, 2002; Schattschneider, 1942); by the economic interests of their districts (Peltzman, 1985); and more. Some scholars even contend that elected representatives vote primarily on the basis of their personal ideological beliefs and preferences (Kalt & Zupan, 1984; Poole & Rosenthal, 1997).

The defenders of all these theories, and of new ones that come along in the future, face a challenge when seeking to provide empirical data to support their arguments. It is the difficulty of answering this seemingly simple question: "What is the voting record of a particular legislator?" It turns out that far from being simple, it's a devilishly difficult question to answer accurately and understandably.

Part of the difficulty is sheer quantity: In most legislative bodies there are hundreds or thousands of roll call votes every year. Thousands of bills and amendments are introduced and hundreds become law. Many of the votes revolve around complex or arcane issues that are impossible to understand without being immersed in their details

and context. Political journalists and insiders generally have a pretty good idea of what the issues are and how most legislators will vote on any given measure, but this knowledge is not easily systematized or transmitted.

In general, political scientists are not close observers of the day to day ebbs and flows of a particular legislative body, and the issues before it. This is not due to lack of diligence, but because it's not their job and not worth their time to delve into every revision of a particular state's insurance code, minor clarifications of its criminal code, or whether a particular departmental budget increases by 3.2 percent or 3.9 percent. Even if a scholar does narrow his or her focus to this extent, in order to use the observations to support a generalizable hypothesis he or she must still distill them into some kind of simplified model.

Political scientists have used a number of tools to answer the question, "What is a lawmaker's voting record?" Essentially, these boil down to two types of measures: The "legislative scorecards" published by certain reputable special interest groups whose biases are known and can be controlled for to some extent, or a "spatial model," in which each legislator's entire voting history is matched against all other members of the same body, and they are all then arranged in right-to-left continuum that captures each legislator's "ideal point" on a dimension relative to the ideal points of all other legislators.

The "state of the art" of the second method is the "D-NOMINATE" model created by Poole and Rosenthal (1997). They have applied their methodology to the entire history of congressional voting in the United States, from 1788 through 1988. Heckman and Snyder (1997) have also created another model of this type with slightly different results.

The other type of measurement - using interest group ratings based on a finite number of selected votes as a proxy for direct observations of voting behavior – has been used by many scholars, including Krehbiel (1994); Dion and Huber (1997); Maltzman (1997); and Bishin (2000). Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder, Jr. (1999) have developed a technique that adjusts a given interest group’s ratings “for inflation,” to account for “shifts” and “stretches” in the ratings scale over time. They demonstrated their method by applying it to the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) ratings for members of Congress, an index widely used by political scientists analyzing voting on the “liberal/conservative” dimension in U.S. politics. The technique can be applied to other ratings, such as those created by the ADA’s conservative counterpart, the American Conservative Union (ACU), or even single-issue groups.

Both of these methods have limitations and shortcomings. Poole and Rosenthal’s model is very complicated, and does not explain the substance or meaning of the dimension on which lawmakers are ranked from left to right. This must be interpreted based on the researcher’s knowledge of the historical context and the salient issues of the day. The model itself has no direct link to the substance of votes.

Analyses using Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder, Jr.’s model (and all others that rely on third party “ratings”) are linked to the substantive issues underlying roll call votes, but necessarily rely on the votes selected created by special interest groups, a method that is fraught with pitfalls, of which the “shift” and “stretch” of the ratings scale are not necessarily the most serious. These pitfalls have been explored by many scholars including Herron (1999) who found that they yield inconsistent results, and Snyder (1992) who found they indicate “artificial extremism.”

One major shortcoming is the fact that interest group ratings are based on a finite number of roll call votes, often a very small selection. For example, the ADA Congressional ratings often used in political science research are derived from a selection of just 20 roll call votes each year!

In addition, the opportunities for mischief by the group's vote selection committee are rife, and most of these are not amenable to adjustment methods. (For example, if the vote selectors want to "punish" or "reward" a certain legislator or party, they can select particular votes that make the individual or party look better or worse on a particular dimension than a fair-minded analysis would show.) The failure of ADA and ACU ratings to discriminate amongst the voting record of legislators with whom they disagree was described in a study by Brunell et al (1999). These groups are mostly interested in drawing fine distinctions between their friends, and tend to bunch their opponents together near the bottom of the scale (creating Snyder's "artificial extremism").

III

An Alternative: A Point-of-View Neutral, “Substance-Based” Benchmark

Related to these issues is the question of exactly what an interest group like the leftist ADA or its counterpart on the right the American Conservative Union (ACU) are actually measuring. The terms “right,” “left,” “liberal” and “conservative” are used to describe political viewpoints, but these have different meanings in different times and places. Those tuned in to the details of an era’s unique political and ideological context know the “code” that determines this issue bundling, and apply it automatically. Close observers often take the identification of particular issues as “liberal” or “conservative” for granted as a “given,” but it is not a given.

This bundling of issues creates what are termed political “ideologies,” or in the term used by Philip Converse (1964), “belief systems.”* Keith Poole (1997) characterized Converse’s theory of ideology as “fundamentally *the knowledge of what-goes-with-what,*” and described it as follows: “In contemporary American politics the knowledge that a politician opposes raising the minimum wage makes it virtually certain that the politician favors a balanced budget, opposes unfunded federal mandates to the states, opposes universal health care, favors ending the entitlement status of welfare, opposes affirmative action, and so on. In short, a *conservative* and almost certainly a Republican.”

However, the criteria by which a particular vote or position is deemed to be “left” or “right,” “liberal” or “conservative,” frequently have no consistent logical basis. The dynamic process by which political parties associate themselves with particular issues was described by Wright and Schaffner (2002) in this way. “(Minority parties) . . . systematically seek out issues that will help them win support from non-participants or

* “Ideology” in this political sense is different from the ideology that derives from first principles.

supporters of the winning party while being constrained to win the support of their core constituencies.” In the process, “Parties link diverse issues, sometimes logically, but also politically as a result of their dynamic searches for electoral advantage.”

The usefulness of the spatial model represented by Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE depends on this concept of issue bundling, but the method does not inform users of the details of the underlying ideology, or of “what-goes-with-what.” For an analysis based on the spatial model to have meaning its results must be interpreted on the basis a detailed knowledge of the issues of the day. While such models are undeniably useful tools, their disassociation from the substance of votes can also make them somewhat unsatisfying.

Interest group ratings do announce what constitutes the ideology they measure by the votes that they include in their rating. The vote selection is an explicit display of “what-goes-with-what” in the view of the interest group. Understanding *why* issue x goes with issue y in a particular ideology again requires a detailed knowledge of the political context responsible for such associations, and this too can be somewhat unsatisfying.

All of this can be frustrating for citizens and voters, who among other things are “cross pressured, preferring one of the party’s stands on some issue and the other party’s stands on others.” (Wright & Schaffner, 2002) Voters may be able to sort out most cross-pressures, but even when they do, they are left trying to determine what broad principles, if any, each party or candidate actually stands for, or whether they actually stand for the broad principles they profess.

In the era of the welfare state perhaps the broadest of broad principles relates to the size, scope and activism of government. In general, and with many exceptions,

Republicans advertise themselves as believing that, at least in domestic affairs, government should be more narrow in scope and have less authority than Democrats do. Democrats advertise themselves as believing that government should have more authority to protect the interests of “the little guy” against powerful economic forces.

And that leads to one of the questions this research seeks to answer: Is there really a difference between the parties on that broad principle? Unlike defining “liberal” or “conservative,” no insider’s knowledge of “what-goes-with-what” is needed to determine whether a particular vote increases the authority of government. This focus provides a logical, consistent criterion that does not change over time: The result of a vote is either more government authority, or less. It is not necessary to reference any political or historical context outside of the content of the vote itself.

It should be noted, however, that this “libertarian” conceptual dimension does not map perfectly against the positions advertised by the parties. Democrats sometimes advertise a preference for less government authority on certain “social issues” like the legal status of abortion, with Republicans promoting more government authority in such areas. In the author’s view, there are relatively few bills voted on in the Michigan legislature where this difference is exhibited.

How parties influence voting behavior in legislatures has long been a subject of scholarly study, going back at least to the work of E.E. Schattsneider in the 1940s, who held that “democracy is impossible save in terms of parties.” (Schattsneider, 1942.) Three decades later David Mayhew famously disagreed (1974), viewing legislators as political entrepreneurs little influenced by party, instead relying on their office’s “constituent services” to assure continued reelection.

These considerations are worth noting, but really are beyond the issues investigated by this research. The question here is simply, in the aggregate and overall, is there actually a difference in the way legislators of different parties vote on bills eventually signed into law that increase government authority?

What is a legislator's voting record? This paper will narrow that question to, "What is a legislator's voting record on increasing government authority?" Having a complete set of concise, non-partisan, "plain English" descriptions of the substance all the votes for two sessions of a single legislature provides a tool with which the question can be answered.

IV

General Project Details

Type of Research

The type of research is a combination of content analysis and post-test only. It is extended in time to examine the votes of Michigan legislators in two one-year periods based on descriptions of each vote contained in an existing secondary source. Based on content analysis of this source, the research will test the same hypothesis in two different years.

Hypothesis

The following hypotheses is tested for the years 2002 and 2004:

In their votes on 119 randomly selected bills that were ultimately signed into law in 2004, and 149 bills from 2002 (20 percent of the total in both years), there was a significant difference between the behavior of the Republican and Democratic caucuses of the Michigan House of Representatives on those bills that had an effect on the amount of government authority (69 out of 119 bills in 2004 and 46 out of 149 in 2002).

The null hypothesis is:

In 2002 and 2004 There was NOT a significant difference between the behavior of Republican and Democratic members of the Michigan House of Representatives on votes that had an effect on the amount of government authority.

Variables

The independent variable is the party of legislators.

The dependent variable is the difference between the mean percentage of the House party caucuses on votes that give government greater authority, as defined by content analysis of MichiganVotes.org bill descriptions.

Level of Data

The level of data for the independent variable is nominal: Party of legislators.

The level of data for the dependent variable is ordinal: The relative number of “yes” votes on bills where the effect of the vote was that the government would have greater authority.

Methodology

To use MichiganVotes.org to measure whether a particular bill increases or decreases government authority, a simplified content analysis was performed on each bill’s description on the site. Based on this analysis, each vote was placed in either a “increase government authority,” “decrease government authority,” or “has no affect” category. A sample was analyzed containing 119 randomly selected bills passed by both houses of the Michigan legislature and sent to the governor in 2004, and 149 such bills from 2002. This is 20 percent of the votes from each year. The bills for the sample were selected at random by picking every fifth bill signed into law.

There is no obstacle to performing the analysis on all 1,343 bills signed into law from both years, or even on every roll call vote, but to keep the project manageable 20 percent of the total were included in the sample. This is still far more than the number included in most voting record analyses by interest groups used in much political science

research. Also, the interest group ratings do not select votes at random, but select ones that expose the group's subjective preference.

Poole and Rosenthal's D-NOMINATE (and similar models) include almost all votes, but as described above do not examine or characterize their substance. They do not include votes on which less than 2.5 percent of legislators disagreed because they are in effect comparing legislators to each other, not to an external benchmark. Special interest group voting analyses may or may not include a unanimous vote depending on their purpose. This research did include unanimous votes, because it compares the Republican and Democratic House caucuses against an independent benchmark to determine whether there is a significant difference between them based on that benchmark. Unanimous votes might be an indication that there is not.

A feature of the MichiganVotes.org website allows users to enter votes they select (with the user's preferred "correct" position on each) onto one axis of an Excel-type spreadsheet that lists all legislators on the other axis. The spreadsheet automatically inserts the "correct" and "incorrect" votes for each legislator, and calculates a score for each measured as a percentage of the total number of votes selected. This tool was used for this research, with the "incorrect vote" being "yes" on bills that increase government authority and "no" on bills that decrease government authority. In this way a score was calculated for each legislator. These individual legislator scores were combined to establish a mean score for each House caucus (Republican or Democrat).

Operational Definitions

The operational definition of “votes that have an effect on the amount of government authority” is derived from the simplified content analysis described in a separate section below.

The operational definition of “difference between Republican and Democratic caucus” is the mean percentage of “correct” votes by all legislators in the Republican caucus and all legislators in the Democratic caucus on bills that have an effect on government authority. “Correct” is defined as “yes” on bills that decrease authority, and “no” on bills that increase it. The mean for each party caucus was calculated by combining the percentage score for each legislator in the caucus.

Assumptions

- Assume that MichiganVotes.org descriptions are accurate.
- Assume that the concise MichiganVotes.org descriptions capture enough of the actual effect of complex bills to enable an assessment of the bill on the criterion selected.
- Assume that it is possible to provide a simple “yes/no” answer to whether a complex bill increases government authority.
- Assume that even if votes are measured on a simple bivariate level (increase/not increase government authority), with no indication of the magnitude of the increase, applying the result to a large number of votes by individual legislators and caucuses provides a meaningful measurement of their behavior.

Limitations

- Only final the final-passage votes of bills that were passed by both houses and signed by the governor are looked at. In the 2003-2004 legislature there were 3,956 bills

introduced, of which 918 were signed into law. In the 2001-2002 legislature there were 4,101 bills introduced, of which 1,027 were signed into law.

- Only MichiganVotes descriptions are examined, not the bills themselves. Primarily this is because one of the purposes of this research is to discover whether MichiganVotes is a useful research tool. It's descriptions are usually less than 150 words; while actual bills range from one paragraph to 300 pages in length.

- The universe of bills that are actually voted on generally does not reflect the preferences of the minority party, because the majority gets to decide which bills are reported out of committee, and which of these get a final vote in both the House and Senate. (There are exceptions: For electoral campaign reasons, the majority party may wish to get a recorded affirmative vote by the minority on an issue the majority believes is unpopular. Also, in 2004 there were a number of votes in which the Republican leadership aligned with Democrats against the majority of the Republican caucus to pass tax and fee increase bills.)

- Legislators can only vote to pass bills that have made it "all the way" to a final passage vote. Committees and other institutions provide a "gatekeeper" role that determines which bills make it this far. The large number of unanimous or nearly unanimous votes shows that a large proportion of these are bills for which there is a bipartisan consensus.

- Because the role of institutional gatekeepers and other factors, the meaningfulness of roll call floor votes has been questioned by some scholars (VanDoren, 1990). Exploring this aspect is beyond the scope of this research. The consensus of the scholars

cited in this paper who have applied so much energy and creativity to analyzing roll call data is (obviously) that this data is meaningful.

- While objective and identifiable, the standard applied here of “votes that increase (or decrease) the authority of government” does not precisely define the basis on which either Republicans or Democrats characterize the difference between their parties. It is a proxy for “limit the size and scope of government” that Republicans profess, and the “government should do more to help people” of Democrats. In issue areas like criminal justice, Republicans tend to favor greater government authority. In issue areas like certain aspects of civil liberties, Democrats tend to favor less government authority. On many bills, only anarchists would favor a “perfect” score opposing all votes that increase government authority: (For example, some of the bills included in this analysis include harsher penalties for defrauding senile seniors, or for sex crimes against children.)
- Budget bills were not included in the analysis, mainly because there is just too much going on in them to be accurately captured in the stripped down MichiganVotes descriptions. Even the much fuller analyses prepared by legislative caucuses and fiscal agencies often leave well informed observers scratching their head about the net effect of a budget.
- In both of the years examined a handful of legislators only served partial terms. These representative’s voting record scores were not included in the analysis, but they are shown at the bottom of the accompanying spreadsheets. This explains why the analysis contains votes of 109 legislators in both years, not 110.

Data Collection Procedures

The secondary source used for this project is MichiganVotes.org, a web site that contains concise, plain language and non-partisan descriptions of every single bill, amendment, and vote in the Michigan legislature. MichiganVotes.org is sponsored by the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit research and educational institution. Use of the site is free, and all of the information it contains is the property of the Center. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is freely granted, provided that the Center is properly cited.

Data Analysis Techniques and Decision Criteria

The hypothesis regarding voting behavior of the legislative caucuses in the Michigan House of Representatives in two different legislatures is amenable to statistical analysis. A t-test was used to compare the caucuses, to a .95 level of significance. The content analysis methodology and decision criteria is described in a separate section below. The third purpose of this research is to determine whether MichiganVotes is a useful research tool. If the procedures used to accomplish the other two purposes are effective and yield meaningful information, then the answer will be judged to be “yes.”

The Content Analysis Design and Methodology

Krippendorff (1980) described content analysis as tool for making valid and replicable inferences from data to their context. It is used when the researcher wants to find out something about the world that can't be observed directly. The classic example of content analysis in action is examining the wartime propaganda of an enemy to generate inferences about the state of mind of its leaders and population. Krippendorff describes this as a “one-way” communication, in that the researcher has no “corrective feedback” with the source of the data. In addition, the content analyst must accept “unstructured” material (vs. structured material that approaches the target directly, such as questionnaires and surveys.)

The thing that cannot be observed directly in this case is the content of legislation passed by the Michigan House of Representatives. Of course, this *can* be observed directly, but given the quantity and complexity of this material, doing so is not practical. State government is vast, and understanding the changes and additions that hundreds of bills make to scores of statutes and programs scattered across dozens of issue areas requires an in-depth knowledge of a particular state's institutions, conventions, political and legislative culture, laws, programs, current events, and more. Obtaining this depth of understanding and applying it to all of the bills passed in a given year is a full time job.

That task, plus describing those bills in “concise, plain-English, non-partisan” terms, *is* the full time job of the description editor of MichiganVotes. The web site's bill and vote descriptions serve as a surrogate for the “thing that cannot be observed directly” in this case.

Unlike the classic content analysis problem, a “corrective feedback” with the source of the web site’s information is possible here – if the MichiganVotes description is unsatisfactory one can always go back and read the text of a particular bill. However, given that one of the purposes here is to determine the usefulness of MichiganVotes as a research tool, it would not advance that to “cheat” by looking at bills themselves. Therefore, in one small sense the task here does resemble the classic content analysis.

Finally, the task here is much simpler than a classic content analysis problem because we are not looking at “unstructured” material, but at a secondary source that is a highly *structured* collection of descriptions of bills and votes.

The goal of this content analysis is to determine from the MichiganVotes.org descriptions whether each bill in the sample has an effect on the authority of government, and separate out those that do not. This was accomplished by creating a form containing seven questions about the effects each bill, based on its MichiganVotes description. The purpose of these questions is not to create a taxonomy of bills, because while the questions are intended to be exhaustive they are not mutually exclusive. The purpose instead is to create a “screen” separating votes that have an effect on the level of government authority from those that do not.

Given all these “head starts” compared to the classic content analysis problem, a relatively simple technique was used to test the reliability of this “screen.” The instrument is considered reliable if different individuals can apply it to a wide variety of bills and get the same results for all or most of them. To test this, a group of four volunteers (plus the author) were asked to apply the instrument to 20 bills.

The volunteers were legislative aides who work for state representatives. The purpose of using these professionals is that many bills deal with arcane details of state government policies and programs. In many cases even the “concise, plain-English” MichiganVotes.org descriptions do not make sense to a layperson who is not very familiar with state government. This is especially true given that this research does not focus on a narrow selection of “hot button” bills in the manner of the interest group ratings described above, but on a random sample of all bills.

The fact that these individuals work in a political environment was not considered to invalidate their responses given that the purpose of this step was simply to test whether the “increase the authority of government” questions are clear. If the level of consensus among the volunteers is high, this suggests that the instrument is reliable, can be applied by other researchers to other legislative bodies and samples of bills, and that the results of doing so can be compared with the results of this research

Following this paragraph is the form with the questions that were applied to each bill. If the answer to any one of these questions was “yes,” the bill was defined as increasing government authority. The volunteers were asked to rely solely on the MichiganVotes descriptions, and to resist “reading between the lines” of descriptions to make inferences beyond what is contained in the description itself.

1.	Does this bill require any businesses or members of the public to do something not now required?	yes___	no___
2.	Does this bill prohibit any businesses or members of the public from doing something not now prohibited?	yes___	no___
3.	Does this bill increase the penalties for doing something already prohibited?	yes___	no___
4.	Does this bill add or raise any taxes or fees on any businesses or members of the public?	yes___	no___
5.	Is the <i>primary purpose</i> of this bill to direct economic activity into certain types of enterprise, or certain geographic areas, through tax breaks or similar mechanisms?	yes___	no___
6.	Does this bill have the effect of requiring more resources to do something the government already does (like employee pay or benefit hikes)?	yes___	no___
7.	Does this bill engage government in an area in which it is not currently engaged?	yes___	no___

The responses of the four volunteers (plus the author) were compared in two ways. First, all 140 responses (20 bills x 7 questions) from each volunteer (plus the author) were compared. Second, just the 20 “final determinations” of whether a bill increased government authority were compared.* This process was repeated three times, with the questions being refined each time to make them more clear and eliminate sources of confusion. The seven questions shown here are the result of this refinement process.

On the “bottom line” consensus for the 20 bills the results were a perfect 20 out of 20: All of the volunteers agreed that 16 of the 20 billed increased government authority, and four of the 20 did not. The respondents concurred on 123 of the individual questions (out of 140). On 11 questions the respondents split 4-1, and on six they split 3-2. Given the fact that the purpose was not to create a taxonomy, and that some of the bills examined were complex and multi-faceted, the fact that there was not complete agreement on the individual questions is considered to be acceptable: It is the nature of a

* Two volunteers might concur that a bill increases government authority, but differ about the particular way(s) in which it does so. For example, one volunteer might indicate that the bill prohibits something not now prohibited, while another other says it requires something not now required.

“screen” that if one obstruction doesn’t capture the target another should do so. That is what occurred in those 11 instances.

These results were tested for reliability using a Hotelling’s T-Square test. This tested the level of agreement of the test subjects on each of seven questions on each of the twenty bills. To test this level of agreement for statistical reliability, the Hotelling T-square procedure required that each bill’s analysis be entered into the computer separately for reliability testing. “Alpha” was chosen as the appropriate test. The Alpha result was .0020. This indicates that the data coding method was reliable. This procedure verifies that the coding process used to conduct the data analysis of this thesis was reliable.

After the instrument was refined and tested in this way, it was applied by just the author to the entire sample of bills from 2002 and 2004 to derive the legislators’ scores for the hypothesis testing portion of this research. To determine if a bill reduced government authority the author applied the “reciprocal” of these questions. For example, if a bill removed an existing prohibition, then a vote against the bill was in effect a vote *for* a law under which the government has greater authority. If a vote was determined to have no effect on government authority, it was not counted in the legislators’ score, and placed on separate list for reference.

The MichiganVotes web site contains descriptions of bills at each stage of the legislative process. Only the description of the final version of each bill was examined, which is the one that was actually sent to the governor and signed into law.

VI

Results of Hypothesis Testing

The hypothesis was tested using a t-test to a .05 level of significance.

In both 2002 and 2004, the differences between the mean percentages of all Republicans and all Democrats on votes that increase the authority of government was significant.

It was noted that in both years a there was a gap between a small group of Republicans with the highest scores, and the rest of the caucus. To ensure that this handful of Republicans were not skewing the data in a manner might call the final conclusion into question, the data was analyzed again with the top Republicans not included in the Republican mean. In 2004 there were four members not included, and in 2002 there were three not included. This difference between the caucuses was still significant. Removing the top Republicans made no difference.

The null hypothesis (that there was NOT a significant difference between the behavior of Republican and Democratic caucuses on government authority votes) was disproved for both years.

VII

Summary of Statistical Analysis

2002 comparison of Democratic and Republican Caucus means

There were 109 representatives included in the analysis (see explanation in “Limitations.”) The lowest score was 16.22 percent, and the highest was 46.81 percent. The mean was 26.38, the median was 25.64 and the range was 30.59.

There were 59 Republicans. The lowest score was 20.00 percent, the highest was 46.81 percent. The mean was 29.5502, the median was 29.7900 and the range was 26.81. The standard deviation was 3.79966, and the standard error of the mean was .49467.

There were 50 Democrats. The lowest score was 16.22 percent, the highest was 29.55 percent. The mean was 22.6394, the median was 23.2950, and the range was 13.33. The standard deviation was 2.70257, and the standard error of the mean was .38220.

The difference between the means was 6.9108. The standard error of the difference was .62512. Equal variances were not assumed, the degrees of freedom was 101.352, for a two-tailed test “t” was 12.240. Conclusion: The result of the t-test performed on SPSS 11.0 showed that the difference between the parties in 2002 is significant, at a .95 level of significance.

2002 comparison of Democratic and Republican Caucus means, excluding highest three Republicans.

The test was repeated without the three highest scoring Republicans (see explanation above), leaving 56 Republicans. The lowest score was 20.00 percent, the highest was 33.33 percent, the mean was 28.9371, the median was 29.7900 and the range

was 13.33. The standard deviation was 2.57753, and the standard error of the mean was .34444.

There were 50 Democrats. The lowest score was 16.22 percent, the highest was 29.55 percent, the mean was 22.6394 and the median was 23.295, and the range was 13.33. The standard deviation was 2.70257, and the standard error of the mean was .38220.

The difference between the means was 6.2977. The standard error of the difference was .52450. Equal variances were not assumed, the degrees of freedom was 101.352, for a two-tailed test “t” was 12.240. Conclusion: The result of the t-test performed on SPSS 11.0 showed that the difference between the parties in 2002 is significant, at a .95 level of significance, even when the highest three Republicans are not included.

2004 comparison of Democratic and Republican Caucus means

There were 109 representatives included in the analysis (see explanation in “Limitations.”) The lowest score was 24.53 percent, and the highest was 56.52 percent. The range was 30.59, the mean was 37.95 and the median was 35.95

There were 64 Republicans. The lowest score was 23.53 percent, the highest was 56.52 percent. The mean was 39.9517, the median was 35.9450 and the range was 33.99. The standard deviation was 5.26317, and the standard error of the mean was .65790.

There were 45 Democrats. The lowest score was 24.53 percent, the highest was 37.31 percent. The mean was 31.8204, the median was 31.7500 and the range was 12.78. The standard deviation was 3.15702, and the standard error of the mean was .47062.

The difference between the means was 5.1313. The standard error of the difference was .80890. Equal variances were not assumed, the degrees of freedom was 104.713, for a two-tailed test “t” was 6.344. Conclusion: The result of the t-test performed on SPSS 11.0 showed that the difference between the parties in 2004 is significant, at a .95 level of significance.

2004 comparison of Democratic and Republican Caucus means, excluding highest four Republicans.

The test was repeated without the four highest scoring Republicans (see explanation above), leaving 60 Republicans. The lowest score was 23.53 percent, the highest was 43.55 percent. The mean was 35.9573, the median was 35.5550 and the range was 20.02. . The standard deviation was 3.58944, and the standard error of the mean was .46339.

There were 45 Democrats. The lowest score was 24.53 percent, the highest was 37.31 percent. The mean was 31.8204, the median was 31.7500, and the range was 12.78. The standard deviation was 3.15702, and the standard error of the mean was .47062.

The difference between the means was 4.1369. The standard error of the difference was .66047. Equal variances were not assumed, the degrees of freedom was 100.339, for a two-tailed test “t” was 6.264. Conclusion: The result of the t-test performed on SPSS 11.0 showed that the difference between the parties in 2004 is significant, at a .95 level of significance, even when the highest three Republicans are not included.

VIII

Discussion

The differences between the House caucuses

George Wallace famously asserted in 1968 that “there’s not a dime’s worth of difference” between the parties. These results show that in Michigan House of Representatives in 2002 and 2004 there was a significant difference between the parties on a meaningful dimension. Republicans generally contend that government has too much authority and it should not be expanded further. Democrats generally contend that government needs more authority in many areas in order to help people. The data from 2002 and 2004 suggest that the different philosophies influence the way in members of the Michigan House vote on bills that affect the amount of authority the government will have.

Was there any *more* than a “dime’s worth” of difference between the parties? That is harder to say. As mentioned above, one of the limitations of this research is that it only looked at bills that were actually signed into law. Various “gatekeeper” institutions limit which bills “go all the way” to this point. Most of the bills analyzed here passed with unanimous or nearly unanimous votes, suggesting that there was little controversy about the non-salient issues these bills addressed. In addition, many of the bills in the sample dealt with very minor issues and made very minor changes to the law. No effort was made to “weight” the bills analyzed on the basis of whether the issues and changes were more or less important. Attempting to do so involves making subjective evaluations that were beyond the scope of this paper. In many cases such evaluations come down to a “I know it when I see it” level of subjectivity.

The author is a very close observer of the legislative process in Michigan, and will go out on a limb to say that a casual scan of the bills on which there was not a near-majority vote indicates that almost all of them involve salient issues that “real people” really care about, including taxes and fees, abortion, religious issues, business regulations, etc. On this basis it’s tempting to conclude that there is “more than a dime’s worth” of difference. This temptation is tempered by the thought that to some people many of the unanimous or nearly unanimous votes may also involve important issues. That caveat noted, the findings do appear to reveal a real difference.

Before getting too complacent with this finding, however, it should also be noted that there can be considerable overlap between the “lowest” scoring Republicans and the “highest” scoring Democrats. In 2004, six Republicans scored below the Democratic mean. If those top four Republican are excluded, five Democrats scored above the median and seven above the mean of the rest of the GOP caucus. In 2002 there was less overlap. In that year, only one Republican scored below the Democratic mean. Three Republicans stood apart from the rest of their caucus with high scores in that year, but the effect of excluding them is less: Only one Democrat scored above the GOP mean (but not above the median) if those top three Republicans are excluded.

The significance of the preceding paragraph is this: Voters don’t vote for a caucus, they vote for a particular individual, Republican or Democrat, and in many districts the person carrying the label of the voter’s party of choice may look a lot like many members of the other party’s legislative caucus. That’s not to say there’s not a “dime’s worth of difference” between the candidates in those races; the opponent may be even further from the voter’s ideal point.

Also, even a candidate outside his or her party mainstream can move public policy toward a party voter's preference if his or her presence in the legislature tips the party into majority status – something that cannot be known before the election. In other words, to the extent a voter believes there *is* more than a dime's worth of difference between the parties, voting for a candidate outside a voter's party's mainstream may still make a big difference in public policy outcomes.

Categorizing bills by the increase or decrease in government authority

The second purpose of this research was to test a method for determining whether bills increase the authority of government or not. No effort was made here to assign different weights to votes depending on whether the authority increase was small or large, or whether the issue was salient or not. Attempting to do so would involve making subjective evaluations that again often come down to, "I know it when I see it."

Nevertheless, there is continuum extending from "big change in government authority, salient issue" to "small change, not salient." Bills at either end are easy to characterize with confidence; those in the middle are less so. Few would argue that the 2004 bill to initiate a process leading to imposing sales tax on Internet and catalog retail purchase belongs in the former category, and the bill to exempt the Village of Millington's Downtown Development Authority from a particular paperwork requirement is at the other end.

It is the bills in the first category (big change, high salience) that tend to have divided votes, however, and therefore to define the differences between the parties. That so many bills in the sample fall in the latter category, and tend to have unanimous or near unanimous final passage votes, is reflected in the fact that the caucuses have low mean

scores ranging from 22 percent to 36 percent over both years, meaning they voted to increase government authority between 78 and 64 percent of the time. Only two legislators voted against increasing government authority more than half the time, in only one of the two years.

The “bills that increase government authority” screen is a useful because it is easy to define and to apply to particular bills. Does anyone other than died-in-the-wool libertarians care about it, though? Conservatives want more government authority in social issues and less in economic affairs. Liberals are just the opposite. The votes analyzed in this research included both kinds of issues.

To a certain extent the parties try to have it both ways on these broad issue categories, advertising that they provide “big tents” which accommodate a broad range of views. No doubt this is because the real business of political parties is getting and keeping power, and in the present era in the United States this means adopting a generally centrist platform, notwithstanding the rhetoric that both sides declaim.

However, in general and with many exceptions, Republicans contend that government has too much authority already, and Democrats say it needs more authority with which to help people. This research shows that to a measurable and significant degree, the parties don’t just “talk the talk,” they also “walk the walk” in this regard. In the final analysis voters have to judge whether the difference is worth more than “a dime.”

Is MichiganVotes a useful research tool?

Finally, the third purpose of this research was to determine whether the MichiganVotes on-line database is a useful tool for political science research. Within the limitations imposed by the fact that the web site is only available for three state legislatures, and only goes back as far as 2001 in one of these states, clearly this is a useful resource. The process of applying the government authority “screen” to several hundred bills was quick and easy. In most cases little thought was required to determine from the MichiganVotes description whether or not a bill belonged in the “increases government authority” category.

In a few cases the decision *was* difficult. The methodology required making the judgment based only on the MichiganVotes description, and that was adhered to. But this did not preclude “peeking” at the text of bill itself *after* the judgment was made. This was done on a handful of those “hard cases,” and it was clear that the reason they were hard was not because of a flaw in MichiganVotes, but because of the nature of the bill itself.

An example is the Village of Millington Downtown Development Authority bill cited above. Is exempting a particular local government entity possessing a kind of taxing power from procedural requirements that apply to other such entities an increase or decrease in government authority? Determining the answer is like peeling an onion. It was deemed an increase because the exemption further empowered a government body vis a vis citizens, and because bills that create an exemption for one individual or entity are inherently an erosion of the rule of law, further empowering officeholders currently in power. Thankfully, such bills are rare. Also, important for this research, they tend not to be ones that generate controversy and divided votes (although perhaps they should).

IX

Conclusion

In conclusion, the exercise described in this paper turned out to be straightforward and manageable, which is remarkable in a way, given that it analyzed the votes of 218 legislators on 268 bills (109 legislators in 2002 and 109 in 2004, many of whom were the same individuals.) This reinforces the conclusion that the MichiganVotes.org on-line database is a useful resource for research, within its limitations in geography and time.

X

Recommendations for further research

1. Perform this analysis on *all* the Public Acts passed in a given year. There is no obstacle to doing so except for the time to apply the “increase government authority” screen to more bills. MichiganVotes is useful in part because it makes this task possible without requiring a heroic effort.

2. Perform this analysis on future legislatures after the party control has changed. Since the inception of MichiganVotes, Republicans have controlled the House and Senate. If one thing is certain in American politics it's that this won't last forever. The minority party can only vote on bills that the majority party wants to vote on. Comparing these results with those from a legislature in which Democrats in one or both houses get to choose what to vote on will be very interesting indeed.

XI

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XII

Attachments

Individual Legislator and Caucus Voting Record Scores

2002

Legislator	Party: R=1; D=2	Score	434 - Require abuse reporting. 105-0	4487 - Require more written contracts. 100-0	5449 - Expand prostitution law. 107-0	5434 - Hike grain dealer fees. 101-0	5112 - Limit pension alienation. 101-0	5108 - Limit pension alienation. 102-0	939 - Terrorism spying penalty. 93-9
Drolet, Leon	1	46.81%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Palmer, Brian	1	40.00%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	N
Bishop, Mike	1	36.17%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Gosselin, Robert	1	33.33%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Gilbert, Jud	1	32.61%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Newell, Gary	1	32.61%	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Bradstreet, Ken	1	31.91%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Hager, Lauren	1	31.91%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Vear, Steve	1	31.91%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Jansen, Mark	1	31.82%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
DeVuyst, Larry	1	31.71%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
O'Neil, William	1	31.11%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Hart, Doug	1	30.95%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Mortimer, Mickey	1	30.95%	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	
Birkholz, Patricia	1	30.43%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Kowall, Mike	1	30.43%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	
Shulman, Marc	1	30.43%	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	
Tabor, Susan	1	30.43%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Hummel, Scott	1	30.23%	Y	n/a	Y	Y	Y	N	
Vander Veen, Barb	1	30.23%	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	
Allen, Jason	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Bisbee, Clark	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Brown, Cameron	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Caul, Sandy	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
DeRossett, Gene	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
George, Tom	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Howell, Jim	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Julian, Larry	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Kooiman, Jerry	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Mead, David	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Meyer, Tom	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Pappageorge, John	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Richardville, Randy	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Shackleton, Scott	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Stewart, John	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Van Woerkom, Gerald	1	29.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Godchaux, Patricia	1	29.55%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Johnson, Rick	1	29.55%	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	
Woronchak, Gary	1	29.55%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Scranton, Judith	1	28.89%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Cassis, Nancy	1	28.57%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Toy, Laura	1	27.91%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	
Stamas, Tony	1	27.66%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Vander Roest, Jerry	1	27.66%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Koetje, James	1	27.27%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Raczkowski, Andrew	1	27.27%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
DeWeese, Paul	1	26.67%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	
LaSata, Charles	1	26.67%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Voorhees, Joanne	1	26.67%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Kuipers, Wayne	1	26.09%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Pumford, Mike	1	26.09%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Johnson, Ruth	1	25.53%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Middaugh, MaryAnn	1	25.53%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Patterson, Bruce	1	25.53%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Richner, Andrew	1	25.53%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Rocca, Sal	1	25.53%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Ehardt, Stephen	1	24.39%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Jelinek, Ron	1	22.73%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Faunce, Jennifer	1	20.00%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Republican Mean		29.5502%							
Republican Mean excluding top three		26.6650%							
Republican Count	59								

Legislator	Party: R=1; D=2	Score	434 - Require abuse reporting. 105-0	4487 - Require more written contracts. 100-0	5449 - Expand prostitution law. 107-0	5434 - Hike grain dealer fees. 101-0	5112 - Limit pension alienation. 101-0	5108 - Limit pension alienation. 102-0	939 - Terrorism spying penalty. 93-9
Republican Median		29.7900%							
Lockwood, Patricia	2	29.55%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mans, George	2	26.19%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zelenko, Paula	2	26.09%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Whitmer, Gretchen	2	25.64%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Bovin, Douglas	2	25.53%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adamini, Stephen	2	25.00%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Daniels, Ken	2	25.00%	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Frank, A.T.	2	25.00%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Garza, Belda	2	25.00%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jacobs, Gilda	2	25.00%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamnick, RuthAnn	2	25.00%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Murphy, Michael	2	25.00%	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rivet, Joseph	2	25.00%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bertero, Virg	2	24.44%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Callahan, William	2	24.44%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Minore, Jack	2	24.39%	Y	E	Y	Y	E	E	Y
Dennis, Julie	2	23.91%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hansen, John	2	23.91%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Schauer, Mark	2	23.91%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Williams, Carl	2	23.91%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Anderson, Glenn	2	23.40%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brown, Rich	2	23.40%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spade, Doug	2	23.40%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Switalski, Michael	2	23.40%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rison, Vera	2	23.33%	Y	Y	Y		E	E	E
Sheltrown, Dale	2	23.26%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
McConico, Bill	2	22.73%	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	E	Y
Neumann, Andy	2	22.73%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Phillips, Clarence	2	22.73%	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	E	Y
Clarke, Hansen	2	22.50%	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Thomas, Samuel B., III	2	22.50%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kolb, Chris	2	22.22%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Woodward, David	2	21.74%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pestka, Steve	2	21.43%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Clark-Coleman, Irma	2	21.28%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lipsev, Alexander	2	21.28%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wojno, Paul	2	21.28%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Plakas, Jim	2	21.05%	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Basham, Ray	2	20.45%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Waters, Mary	2	20.45%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lemmons III, LaMar	2	20.00%	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y
Schermesser, Gloria	2	20.00%	Y	Y	E	Y	E	E	Y
Gielegem, Paul	2	19.57%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reeves, Triette	2	19.44%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Quarles, Nancy	2	19.35%	E	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	X
Bogardus, Rose	2	18.92%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Stallworth, Keith	2	17.86%	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Hale, Derrick	2	17.07%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hardman, Artina Tinsley	2	17.07%	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	E	Y
Brown, Bob	2	16.22%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Mean		22.6394%							
Democratuc Median		23.2950%							
Democratic Count	50								
Kilpatrick, Kwame	D	25.00%	n/a	X	Y	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Durhal, Fred, Jr.	D	30.77%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sanborn, Alan	R	20.00%	n/a	Y	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Legislator	5151 - Cap civil-law appeal bond. 100-0	5442 - Increase assault penalty. 100-2	5568 - Extend targeted tax break. 105-0	4799 - Authorize special assessments. 102-0	4603 - Expand Medicaid. 106-0	776 - Increase loan fraud penalty. 105-0	6043 - Allow DDA. 101-0	992 - Increase licensure fines. 96-5
Republican Median								
Lockwood, Patricia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Mans, George	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zelenko, Paula	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Whitmer, Gretchen	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Bovin, Douglas	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adamini, Stephen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Daniels, Ken	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Frank, A.T.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Garza, Belda	Y	Y	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jacobs, Gilda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	Y
Jamnick, RuthAnn	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y
Murphy, Michael	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rivet, Joseph	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	Y
Bernero, Virg	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Callahan, William	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Minore, Jack	E	E	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y
Dennis, Julie	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hansen, John	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Schauer, Mark	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Williams, Carl	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Anderson, Glenn	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brown, Rich	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spade, Doug	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Switalski, Michael	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rison, Vera	Y	Y	E	Y	E	Y	E	Y
Sheltrown, Dale	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	N
McConico, Bill	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Neumann, Andy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Phillips, Clarence	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Clarke, Hansen	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y
Thomas, Samuel B., III	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	Y
Kolb, Chris	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Woodward, David	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pestka, Steve	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Clark-Coleman, Irma	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lipsey, Alexander	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wojno, Paul	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Plakas, Jim	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Basham, Ray	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Waters, Mary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lemmons III, LaMar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Schermesser, Gloria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	E
Gielegem, Paul	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reeves, Triette	E	E	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y
Quarles, Nancy	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	X
Bogardus, Rose	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	X
Stallworth, Keith	E	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hale, Derrick	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hardman, Artina Tinsley	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brown, Bob	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Mean								
Democratuc Median								
Democratic Count								
Kilpatrick, Kwame	n/a	n/a	n/a	Y	Y	n/a	n/a	n/a
Durhal, Fred, Jr.	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sanborn, Alan	n/a	n/a	n/a	Y	Y	n/a	n/a	n/a

Legislator	6095 - Increase "ecstasy" penalty. 106-1	5149 - Increase car theft penalty. 94-0	1401 - Allow motorsport BYOB. 94-6	213 - Allow substitute teachers. 56-49	4551 - Increase court fees. 99-0	6004 - Increase child support penalty. 99-0	5584 - Raise deed fee. 84-15	4551 - Increase court fees. 99-0
Republican Median								
Lockwood, Patricia	X	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mans, George	Y	E	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zelenko, Paula	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Whitmer, Gretchen	Y	Y	Y	N	X	X	Y	Y
Bovin, Douglas	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adamini, Stephen	E	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Daniels, Ken	Y	X	Y	N	E	Y	Y	Y
Frank, A.T.	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Garza, Belda	Y	Y	Y	N	X	Y	Y	Y
Jacobs, Gilda	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamnick, RuthAnn	Y	Y	Y	N	X	Y	Y	Y
Murphy, Michael	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	E
Rivet, Joseph	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bernero, Virg	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	E
Callahan, William	Y	E	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Minore, Jack	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dennis, Julie	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hansen, John	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Schauer, Mark	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Williams, Carl	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Anderson, Glenn	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brown, Rich	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spade, Doug	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Switalski, Michael	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rison, Vera	Y	E	E	N	E	X	Y	Y
Sheltrown, Dale	Y	Y	Y	N	E	Y	Y	Y
McConico, Bill	Y	Y	X	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Neumann, Andy	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Phillips, Clarence	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Clarke, Hansen	Y	Y	E	N	Y	X	Y	Y
Thomas, Samuel B., III	Y	X	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kolb, Chris	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	X	Y
Woodward, David	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pestka, Steve	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Clark-Coleman, Irma	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lipsey, Alexander	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wojno, Paul	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Plakas, Jim	Y	X	X	N	X	Y	Y	X
Basham, Ray	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y
Waters, Mary	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lemmons III, LaMar	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Schermesser, Gloria	Y	E	Y	N	Y	E	Y	X
Gielegem, Paul	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reeves, Triette	Y	Y	E	N	Y	Y	Y	E
Quarles, Nancy	Y	Y	X	N	X	Y	E	X
Bogardus, Rose	Y	X	E	N	Y	E	Y	Y
Stallworth, Keith	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	E	E	Y
Hale, Derrick	Y	E	N	N	Y	X	Y	Y
Hardman, Artina Tinsley	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brown, Bob	Y	X	E	X	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Mean								
Democratuc Median								
Democratuc Count								
Kilpatrick, Kwame	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	E	n/a	n/a	n/a
Durhal, Fred, Jr.	n/a	Y	Y	N	n/a	n/a	n/a	Y
Sanborn, Alan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	Y	n/a	n/a	n/a

Individual Legislator and Caucus Voting Record Scores

2004

Legislator	Party: R=1; D=2	Score	4340 - Raise teacher pensions. 105-0	842 - Ban traffic light changers. 105-0.	497 - Ban items from landfill. 98-7.	5234 - Restrict imported garbage.103-2.	5119 - Medicaid lead mandate. 88- 16	5344 - Targeted tax breaks. 107-0	742 - Mandate smoke alarms. 93- 12
Indexed House Vote		-	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Drolet, Leon	1	56.52%	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Garfield, John	1	52.46%	Y	E	N	Y	N	Y	N
Hoogendyk, Jacob	1	49.28%	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
Sheen, Fulton	1	49.21%	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
DeRoche, Craig	1	43.55%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Milosch, Matt	1	43.48%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Caswell, Bruce	1	42.03%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Huizenga, Bill	1	42.03%	E	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Pastor, John	1	42.03%	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
Koeltje, James	1	41.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y
Palmer, Brian	1	41.79%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Brandenburg, Jack	1	40.63%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Stahl, John	1	40.58%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Hummel, Scott	1	40.30%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Shackleton, Scott	1	39.06%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Steil, Glenn, Jr.	1	38.81%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
LaSata, Charles	1	37.88%	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	Y
Acciavatti, Daniel	1	37.68%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hune, Joe	1	37.68%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nitz, Neal	1	37.68%	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
Nofs, Mike	1	37.68%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Goodman	1	37.68%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ward, Chris	1	37.31%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tabor, Susan	1	36.92%	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Stakoe, John	1	36.76%	Y	Y	N	E	Y	Y	Y
Voorhees, Joanne	1	36.76%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Amos, Fran	1	36.23%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Emmons, Judy	1	36.23%	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Farhat, David	1	36.23%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kooiman, Jerry	1	36.23%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Robertson, David	1	36.23%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bradstreet, Ken	1	36.07%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	E
Hager, Lauren	1	35.82%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Van Regenmorter, W.	1	35.82%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Meyer, Tom	1	35.29%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Moolenaar, John	1	35.29%	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y
Palsrok, David	1	35.29%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vander Veen, Barb	1	35.29%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Bisbee, Clark	1	34.92%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
DeRossett, Gene	1	34.92%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Caul, Sandy	1	34.85%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elkins, Jennifer	1	34.78%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Walker, Howard	1	34.78%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pappageorge, John	1	34.38%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Casperson, Tom	1	34.33%	Y	Y	E	Y	E	Y	Y
LaJoy, Philip	1	34.33%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Newell, Gary	1	34.33%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Julian, Larry	1	33.82%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Richardville, Randy	1	33.82%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gaffney, Edward	1	33.33%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Middaugh, MaryAnn	1	33.33%	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	Y
Mortimer, Mickey	1	33.33%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pumford, Mike	1	33.33%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Shaffer, Rick	1	33.33%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Shulman, Marc	1	33.33%	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Howell, Jim	1	32.84%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Johnson, Ruth	1	32.84%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Johnson, Rick	1	32.26%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rocca, Sal	1	31.75%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ehardt, Stephen	1	31.48%	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Stewart, John	1	31.34%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wenke, Lorence	1	31.15%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Woronchak, Gary	1	30.88%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hart, Doug	1	23.53%	Y	E	E	Y	E	Y	Y
GOP Average		36.95%							
Republican Average excluding top four		33.5400%							
Republican Median		35.9450%							

Legislator	1017 - Reallocate drivers ed \$. 106-0	1014 - Increase ag fund admin \$. 96-12	560 - Hike groundwater discharge fees. 56-49	5428 - Ease antique pistol regulations. 104-0	1287 - Ban molotov cocktails. 103-6	5554 - Limit state forest uses. 63-37	4867 - Allow pistol on state land. 103-2	5182 - Expedite meth lab eviction. 93-11
Republican count								
Gillard, Matthew	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Law, Kathleen	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	N	Y	Y
Meisner, Andy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Hardman, A. T.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	E	N
Hood, Morris, III	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Rivet, Joseph	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Stallworth, Alma	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Accavitti, Frank, Jr.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Hunter, Tupac	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	X
Farrah, Barbara	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Waters, Mary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Dennis, Julie	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Lipsey, Alexander	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Murphy, Michael	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Tobocman, Steve	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Byrum, Dianne	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Anderson, Glenn	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Sheltrown, Dale	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Daniels, Ken	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	E	E
Hopgood, Hoon-Yung	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Spade, Doug	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Brown, Rich	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zelenko, Paula	E	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kolb, Chris	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	X	N
Williams, Carl	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Adamini, Stephen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bieda, Steve	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Gleason, John	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	X
Vagnozzi, Aldo	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Clack, Brenda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y
Phillips, Clarence	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	Y
Condino, Paul	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
O'Neil, William	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Woodward, David	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Minore, Jack	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	X	Y
Woino, Lisa	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Plakas, Jim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
McConico, Bill	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Sak, Michael	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Jamnick, RuthAnn	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	N	Y	Y
Cheeks, Marsha	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	N	Y	Y
Gielegem, Paul	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Whitmer, Gretchen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	E	Y
Smith, Virgil, Jr.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Reeves, Triette	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	N
Democratic Ave.								
Democratic Median								
Democratic Count								
Paletko, Daniel	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	Y	n/a
Dillon, Andy	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	Y	n/a	n/a	n/a

Legislator	5947 - Ease pharm. marketing rules. 106-1	5839 - Limit ISD millages. 61-46.	4358 - Ease truck length limits. 68-33	184 - Donated car tax break	4231 - Expand auto dealer rules. 93-1	72 - Create pregnant student programs. 99-0	5470 - Mandate divorce effects class. 63-44	1267 - Make telecoms give numbers to 9-1-1. 100-1
Republican count								
Gillard, Matthew	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Law, Kathleen	Y	N	N	E	E	E	N	E
Meisner, Andy	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Hardman, A. T.	Y	N	N	Y	E	Y	N	E
Hood, Morris, III	Y	N	X	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Rivet, Joseph	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Stallworth, Alma	Y	N	E	Y	E	E	N	E
Accavitti, Frank, Jr.	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Hunter, Tupac	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Farrah, Barbara	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Waters, Mary	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Dennis, Julie	Y	N	N	Y	E	E	N	E
Lipsey, Alexander	Y	N	N	Y	E	E	N	Y
Murphy, Michael	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tobocman, Steve	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Byrum, Dianne	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Anderson, Glenn	Y	E	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Sheltrown, Dale	Y	N	Y	Y	X	Y	N	Y
Daniels, Ken	Y	N	E	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Hopgood, Hoon-Yung	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Spade, Doug	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brown, Rich	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Zelenko, Paula	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Kolb, Chris	Y	N	N	Y	E	E	N	Y
Williams, Carl	Y	N	N	X	Y	Y	N	Y
Adamini, Stephen	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Bieda, Steve	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Gleason, John	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vagnozzi, Aldo	Y	N	N	Y	X	Y	N	Y
Clack, Brenda	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Phillips, Clarence	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Condino, Paul	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
O'Neil, William	Y	N	N	Y	X	Y	N	Y
Woodward, David	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Minore, Jack	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Woino, Lisa	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Plakas, Jim	Y	N	N	Y	X	Y	N	E
McConico, Bill	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	X	Y
Sak, Michael	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamnick, RuthAnn	Y	N	X	Y	Y	X	N	Y
Cheeks, Marsha	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Gielegghem, Paul	E	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Whitmer, Gretchen	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Smith, Virgil, Jr.	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Reeves, Triette	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Ave.								
Democratic Median								
Democratic Count								
Paletko, Daniel	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Dillon, Andy	n/a	n/a	n/a	Y	Y	Y	n/a	Y

Legislator	1176 - Ban animal research vandalism. 103-1.	1202 - Allow historical district TAFE. 97-4	1341 - Expand MSHDA authority. 104-1	4096 - expand child ombudsman role. 100-7	5055 - Ease erosion regs. 99-0	5373 - Increase child support bail. 75-32	5763 - Expand bankruptcy seizure exemptions. 106-0	6029 - Increase pawnbroker rules. 103-0
Republican count								
Gillard, Matthew	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Law, Kathleen	E	E	E	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Meisner, Andy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Hardman, A. T.	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	N	Y	Y
Hood, Morris, III	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	E	Y
Rivet, Joseph	Y	X	Y	Y	E	E	Y	E
Stallworth, Alma	X	Y	E	Y	E	N	E	Y
Accavitti, Frank, Jr.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Hunter, Tupac	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Farrah, Barbara	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Waters, Mary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Dennis, Julie	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Lipsey, Alexander	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Murphy, Michael	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Tobocman, Steve	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	E
Byrum, Dianne	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Anderson, Glenn	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Sheltrown, Dale	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Daniels, Ken	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	N	Y	Y
Hopgood, Hoon-Yung	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Spade, Doug	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brown, Rich	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zelenko, Paula	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Kolb, Chris	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Williams, Carl	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	E
Adamini, Stephen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Bieda, Steve	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gleason, John	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vagnozzi, Aldo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Clack, Brenda	Y	Y	Y	E	Y	N	Y	Y
Phillips, Clarence	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Condino, Paul	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
O'Neil, William	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Woodward, David	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Minore, Jack	X	X	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Woino, Lisa	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Plakas, Jim	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	N	Y	Y
McConico, Bill	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	N	Y	Y
Sak, Michael	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamnick, RuthAnn	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	N	Y	Y
Cheeks, Marsha	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	N	Y	Y
Gielegem, Paul	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	E
Whitmer, Gretchen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Smith, Virgil, Jr.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Reeves, Triette	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	E	X	E
Democratic Ave.								
Democratic Median								
Democratic Count								
Paletko, Daniel	n/a	n/a	n/a	Y	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Dillon, Andy	Y	Y	Y	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Legislator	1387 - Authorize movie pirating suits. 103-1	4787 - Expand MSHDA subsidies. 87-10	5121 - Allow GR, Detroit school police. 105-0	798 - Impose merchant ID theft duties. 105-0	6177 - Ban ID theft actions. 105-0	1369 - "Raid" on jury fund. 85-10
Indexed House Vote	N	N	N	N	N	N
Drolet, Leon	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Garfield, John	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	X
Hoogendyk, Jacob	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Sheen, Fulton	Y	N	Y	E	E	N
DeRoche, Craig	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Milosch, Matt	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Caswell, Bruce	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Huizenga, Bill	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Pastor, John	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Koetjé, James	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Palmer, Brian	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brandenburg, Jack	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Stahl, John	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Hummel, Scott	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Shackleton, Scott	Y	Y	Y	Y	E	Y
Steil, Glenn, Jr.	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
LaSata, Charles	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Acciavatti, Daniel	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hune, Joe	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Nitz, Neal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nofs, Mike	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Goodman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ward, Chris	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Tabor, Susan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Stakoe, John	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Voorhees, Joanne	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Amos, Fran	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Emmons, Judy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Farhat, David	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kooiman, Jerry	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Robertson, David	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bradstreet, Ken	X	X	X	Y	Y	X
Hager, Lauren	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Van Regenmorter, W.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Meyer, Tom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Moolenaar, John	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Palsrok, David	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vander Veen, Barb	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bisbee, Clark	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
DeRossett, Gene	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	X
Caul, Sandy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elkins, Jennifer	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Walker, Howard	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Pappageorge, John	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Casperson, Tom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
LaJoy, Philip	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Newell, Gary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Julian, Larry	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Richardville, Randy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gaffney, Edward	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Middaugh, MaryAnn	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	N
Mortimer, Mickey	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	E
Pumford, Mike	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Shaffer, Rick	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Shulman, Marc	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Howell, Jim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Johnson, Ruth	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Johnson, Rick	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rocca, Sal	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ehardt, Stephen	Y	X	E	Y	Y	Y
Stewart, John	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wenke, Lorence	Y	Y	Y	E	E	Y
Woronchak, Gary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hart, Doug	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
GOP Average						
Republican Average excluding top four						
Republican Median						

Legislator	1387 - Authorize movie pirating suits. 103-1	4787 - Expand MSHDA subsidies. 87-10	5121 - Allow GR. Detroit school police. 105-0	798 - Impose merchant ID theft duties. 105-0	6177 - Ban ID theft actions. 105-0	1369 - "Raid" on jury fund. 85-10
Republican count						
Gillard, Matthew	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Law, Kathleen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
Meisner, Andy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hardman, A. T.	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	E
Hood, Morris, III	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	X
Rivet, Joseph	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Stallworth, Alma	Y	E	E	E	Y	E
Accavitti, Frank, Jr.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hunter, Tupac	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Farrah, Barbara	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Waters, Mary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dennis, Julie	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lipsey, Alexander	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Murphy, Michael	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tobocman, Steve	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Byrum, Dianne	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Anderson, Glenn	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sheltrown, Dale	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Daniels, Ken	X	Y	E	E	E	Y
Hopgood, Hoon-Yung	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spade, Doug	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brown, Rich	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zelenko, Paula	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kolb, Chris	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Williams, Carl	E	E	Y	Y	Y	X
Adamini, Stephen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bieda, Steve	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gleason, John	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vagnozzi, Aldo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Clack, Brenda	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y
Phillips, Clarence	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y
Condino, Paul	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
O'Neil, William	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Woodward, David	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Minore, Jack	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Woino, Lisa	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Plakas, Jim	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
McConico, Bill	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sak, Michael	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamnick, RuthAnn	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cheeks, Marsha	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gielegem, Paul	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Whitmer, Gretchen	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	X
Smith, Virgil, Jr.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reeves, Triette	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	X
Democratic Ave.						
Democratic Median						
Democratic Count						
Paletko, Daniel	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Dillon, Andy	Y	Y	n/a	n/a	n/a	Y

2002 bills

Table contains 103 bills judged to have no effect on government authority, or not counted for reasons explained in text.

Separate spreadsheet contains 46 bills judged to increase or decrease government authority.

Total sample size: 149 (20 percent of 747 Public Acts in 2002).

PA	Bill	Description	Roll Call
5	615	Rename road.	102-0
20	5024	Revise deed details.	96-9
25	718	Revise workers' comp details.	98-0
30	5391	Revise sentence guidelines.	102-0
35	541	Revise aeronautics code.	103-0
40	4690	Create multistate parole compact.	108-0
50	999	Revise telecom right-of-way.	105-1
55	799	Broaden state fund investments.	100-0
60	5406	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	103-0
65	5414	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	106-0
70	5418	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	106-0
75	692	Revise farm development rights.	99-0
85	886	Revise Auditor General References	106-0
90	690	Revise Metro airport board.	75-31
105	892	Revise Auditor General References	106-0
110	678	Revise auto dealer tax.	102-0
145	902	Revise Auditor General References	104-0
150	811	Privatize rest area info.	103-1
155	900	Revise Auditor General References	104-0
160	388	Revise candidate filing rules.	102-0
165	971	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	103-0
170	906	Revise Auditor General References	99-0
175	911	Revise Auditor General References	105-0
180	918	Revise Auditor General References	97-0
190	835	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	100-0
195	968	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	105-0
200	975	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	106-0
210	1032	Repeal archaic law.	96-0
215	5626	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	103-0
220	5631	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	103-0
225	844	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	103-0
230	851	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	106-0
235	861	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	105-0
240	867	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	99-0
245	5298	Clarify criminal law detail.	101-0
250	839	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	96-0
260	1034	Repeal archaic law.	107-0
275	852	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	106-0
285	983	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	100-0
290	1038	Repeal archaic law.	103-0
295	1046	Repeal archaic law.	101-0
300	1063	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	103-0
305	685	Rename road	103-0
310	1075	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	100-0
320	1043	Repeal archaic law.	104-0
330	5840	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	102-0
335	5837	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	100-0
340	5846	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	101-0
345	5852	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	102-0

350	5710	Revise Auditor General duties.	103-0
355	5717	Revise Auditor General duties.	105-0
360	4655	Reallocate family planning \$.	67-36
365	5615	Revise Auditor General duties.	101-0
370	5665	Revise Auditor General duties.	103-0
375	5670	Revise Auditor General duties.	106-0
380	1168	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	98-0
385	1169	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	103-0
395	5850	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	90-0
400	5454	Revise government liability rules.	104-0
405	863	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	107-0
410	1073	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	100-0
415	1082	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	100-0
420	5475	Revise road repair.	106-0
425	5750	Repeal obsolete law.	102-0
430	917	Revise Auditor General duties.	99-0
435	1172	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	102-0
440	540	Land conveyance.	100-0
445	445	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	101-0
450	1313	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	100-0
455	477	Revise cell phone tax.	93-0
465	965	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	95-0
470	1201	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	89-0
480	5991	Revise die ownership.	102-0
485	5804	“Brand” flood car title.	104-0
490	5362	Revise dealer plate fee.	105-0
500	1314	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	99-0
505	5860	Allow computer tax roll.	105-0
515	5648	Judiciary budget.	95-7
520	1104	DEQ budget.	103-0
525	1106	DNR budget.	103-3
530	4373	Supplemental budget.	97-10
535	535	Revise cemetery procedures.	102-0
540	5336	Revise library mergers.	99-0
545	833	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	102-0
550	534	Revise cemetery procedures.	103-0
555	1062	Revise Government Bonding Regulation References.	103-0
560	287	Supplemental budget.	101-1
580	594	Revise corporation law.	104-0
590	1119	Revise dentistry board.	103-0
595	556	Revise mental health authority.	103-0
610	1238	Revise utility assessments.	100-2
615	6479	Revise Indian taxation.	91-13
620	914	Revise Auditor General References	102-0
625	625	Revise child testimony rules.	95-1
635	5999	Revise annuity valuation.	91-0
640	5049	Revise MEAP release rules.	106-0
645	5371	Revise state website.	102-1
650	795	Allow lighthouse lease.	97-0
695	5583	Revise school day care.	103-0
705	5716	Revise Auditor General References	104-0
715	6498	Revise judgeships.	74-29
730	5730	Repeal Local Act.	103-0
745	1417	Revise ISD tax detail.	103-0

2004 bills

Table contains 50 bills judged to have no effect on government authority, or not counted for reasons explained in text.

Separate spreadsheet contains 69 bills judged to increase or decrease government authority.

Total sample size: 119 (20 percent of 596 Public Acts in 2004.)

PA	Bill	Description	Roll Call
10	4276	Declare Holocaust Day	105-0
15	801	Publish PAs on line	103-1
20	681	Allow video expert witness testimony	107-0
30	4675	Let dental hygeinacist give nitrous	103-0
45	5386	Land conveyance	104-9
50	5279	Revise state police retirement	109-0
80	5445	Require more MEGA reporting	105-0
85	5641	Procedure to move county seat	109-0
95	759	Require DNR provide marine fueling info	102-0
115	1026	Require Michigan Mfg. Day	103-0
120	991	Revise hospital authority definitions	106-0
140	5491	Name road after Underground RR	106-0
165	943	Revise school sex ed boards	99-6
185	1194	School aid supplemental – pro-rated cuts	106-0
195	5589	Require child abuse investigator disclose purpose.	105-0
210	4776	Revise child support procedures	72-37
220	5674	Authorize drug court	105-0
225	999	Authorize drug court	105-0
290	5995	Clarify Election Consolidation	105-1
295	6000	Clarify Election Consolidation	107-1
300	6005	Clarify Election Consolidation	106-1
305	5198	Restrict school publishing student personal info	104-0
320	1297	Conveyances	100-0
340	5519	HAL budget	96-11
345	1064	Corrections Budget	89-14
350	1066	DEQ Budget	102-0
355	1104	Revenue sharing budget details	97-9
360	5527	Supplemental Budget	100-1
370	1123	Conveyance	102-0
385	1340	Revise unclaimed property law	103-0
395	1281	Create "gem park" award	98-3
400	5181	Create child lead commission	88-15
405	6047	Revise municipal planning	95-4
425	6230	Revise MEAP dates	103-0
430	753	Create child lead commission	91-8
440	5645	Require deputy deeds recorder	98-3
445	4969	Revise welfare asset cap	105-0
470	6009	Revise Mich. Children’s Institute	107-0
475	1444	Revise foster care proceedings	102-0
485	1243	Rename road	108-0
490	517	Revise city worker pension system	101-1
510	677	Revise mobile classroom regulations	99-0
525	1416	Revise subdivision plat approval process	106-0
540	931	Revise foreclosure process	103-0
545	1148	Free sportsman license for soldiers	101-0
550	1409	Rules for electronic govt documents	94-0
555	1470	Revise patient advocate rules	100-0
580	6104	Create trauma care committee	105-1
590	6295	Revise utility easements	103-0
595	1156	Replace MEAP with ACT	102-7

Bill:	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree	is yes	concurrence level
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: fit-content;"> There is "consensus" as defined in text if all five respondents answer at least one question about the bill 'yes,' or answer all questions 'no.' The 'yes' answers can be to different questions. </div>										
Bill: 5470	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree	is yes	concurrence level
Q1	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Bill: 5373	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	1	1	2	1	3	5	60%		60%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	1	1	1	2	1	4	5	80%		80%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	1	2	1	5	20%		80%
Q7	2	2	2	1	2	1	5	20%		80%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Bill: 5505	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q4	1	1	1	1	2	4	5	80%		80%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Bill: 4867	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Bill: 1222	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Bill: 649	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Bill: 4742	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	1	1	2	1	3	5	60%		60%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	1	1	1	2	1	4	5	80%		80%
Q4	2	2	2	1	2	1	5	20%		80%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%

Bill:	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Bill: 4362	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Bill: 4771	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	1	1	1	2	1	4	5	80%		80%
Q4	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Bill: 5176	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Bill: 5743	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	1	1	2	1	3	5	60%		60%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	0%		100%
Bill: 5823	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q4	2	1	2	2	1	2	5	40%		60%
Q5	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Bill: 662	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q3	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Bill: 1287	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q2	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Q3	2	1	1	2	1	3	5	60%		60%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q5	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q6	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q7	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Concensus	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	100%		100%
Bill: 912	Jack	Sue	Isaac	Marla	Mark	No. "yes"	Total possible	Percent agree		
Q1	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%
Q2	2	2	2	2	1	1	5	20%		80%
Q3	1	1	1	1	2	4	5	80%		80%
Q4	2	2	2	2	2	0	5	0%		100%

